Science and Values Influencing Predator Control for Alaska Moose Management

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Commentary

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ABSTRACT We encourage informed and transparent decision-making processes concerning the recently expanded programs in Alaska, USA, to reduce predation on moose (Alces alces). The decision whether to implement predator control ultimately concerns what society should value; therefore, policymakers, not objective biologists, play a leadership role. From a management and scientific standpoint, biological support for these predator-control programs requires convincing evidence that 1) predators kill substantial numbers of moose that would otherwise mostly live and be available for harvest, 2) low predation can facilitate reliably higher harvests of moose, 3) given less predation, habitats can sustain more moose and be protected from too many moose, and 4) sustainable populations of Alaska's brown bears (Ursus arctos), black bears (Ursus americanus), and wolves (Canis lupus) will exist in and out of control areas. We reviewed 10 moose mortality studies, 36 case histories, 10 manipulative studies, 15 moose nutrition studies, and 3 recent successful uses of nutrition-based management to harvest excess female moose. Results of these studies support application of long-term, substantial predator control for increasing yield of moose in these simple systems where moose are a primary prey of 3 effective predators. We found no substantive, contradictory results in these systems. However, to identify and administer feasible moose population objectives, recently established moose nutritional indices must be monitored, and regulatory bodies must accept nutrition-based management. In addition, the efficacy of techniques to reduce bear predation requires further study. Predicting precise results of predator control on subsequent harvest of moose will continue to be problematic because of a diversity of changing interactions among biological, environmental, and practical factors. In Alaska, the governor has the prerogative to influence regulations on predator control by appointing members to the Board of Game. At least annually, the Board of Game hears a wide spectrum of public opinions opposing and favoring predator control. We summarized these opinions as well as the societal and cultural values and expectations that are often the primary basis for debates. Advocates on both sides of the debate suggest they hold the higher conservation ethic, and both sides provide biased science. We recommend a more constructive and credible dialogue that focuses openly on values rather than on biased science and fabricated conspiracies. To be credible and to add substance in this divisive political arena, biologists must be well informed and provide complete information in an unbiased and respectful manner without exaggeration.

KEY WORDS Predator-control programs generate controversy among the public, policymakers, and wildlife professionals. Incomplete and outdated information, as well as purposeful misinformation, often contribute to this controversy. In addition, arguments over science in this arena are often a surrogate venue for arguments over commonly undefined values and preferences (Lackey 2007). Thus, periodic review of relevant science, politics, values, and expectations is an essential step toward clarifying motives for arguments and encouraging informed decisions and transparent decision-making processes.

We reviewed the science and values of this arena from the perspective of agency research biologists. The senior author (R. D. Boertje) has conducted relevant Alaska, USA, studies since 1981 on predator–prey relationships, wildlife nutrition, and ecology, under diverse administrations. Several administrations banned predator control. Three recent administrations embraced predator control, particularly for elevating moose (Alces alces) harvest. Harbo and Dean (1983), Stephenson et al. (1995), the National Research Council (1997), Regelin et al. (2005), and Titus (2007) reviewed the history of predator management in Alaska and the relevant political discourse, litigation, and status of predator and prey populations. Other reviews present arguments against Alaska’s predator management, based largely on selective social values and selective review of the subject (Schwartz et al. 2003, Van Ballenberghe 2006, Zager and Beecham 2006). Decker et al. (2006) surveyed Alaskans and found that citizens most supportive of brown bear (Ursus arctos) and wolf (Canis lupus) management were also most reliant on moose and caribou (Rangifer tarandus) for food.

We reviewed data and results from simple predator–prey systems, where one large prey species (moose) was usually the primary prey of 3 large effective predators (brown bears, black bears [Ursus americanus], and wolves). Caribou and Dall sheep (Ovis dalli) were the only other large prey in these systems (Gasaway et al. 1983). Caribou are generally a less-reliable prey than moose because seasonal distribution is more clumped and unpredictable, and voids exist in caribou distribution in inland Alaska. Most of our review covered inland areas of Alaska and Yukon, Canada, because most predator-management programs for moose were in taiga environments with minor maritime influences. However, we also reviewed relevant Alaska studies from in and near the Anchorage area, including studies from Kalgin Island and the Kenai Peninsula.

One overriding impetus for our review was a resurgence of controversial predator control plans requested and approved by the Board of Game to increase harvestable surplus of moose and caribou to meet defined consumptive needs of largely Alaska residents pursuant to 1994 legislation (Alaska Fish and Game Laws and Regulations Annotated 2008:27–29). Since statehood (1959), predator-control programs focused on reducing wolf predation. Recent plans added a novel emphasis on reducing bear predation, which intensi-

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fied the debate on predator control (Schwartz et al. 2003, Van Ballenberghe 2006). Recent programs began in winters 2003–2004 and 2004–2005 to control wolves for moose management (Titus 2007). Associated new, area-specific programs to reduce black bear or brown bear numbers began annually during 2002–2007 and in 2009. The Board of Game’s intent was to find effective methods for private citizens to decrease bear predation on summer moose calves to increase yield of moose.

Our objectives were to 1) review studies and case histories to identify major and minor factors affecting moose population dynamics in inland Alaska; 2) review manipulative studies in Alaska that investigated whether moose survival could be increased by substantially reducing predation; 3) review case histories that tested whether a lower level of predation was associated with higher yield of moose; 4) review the practical realities of evaluating whether habitats can support more moose, be protected from too many moose, and be improved in anticipation of more moose following predator control; 5) evaluate the security of large predator populations in Alaska in the context of control programs; and 6) provide a basic legal background and relate some of the divisive values, opinions, and expectations in this arena, as well as the unique role of biologists.

RELATIVE EFFECT OF PREDATION AND OTHER FACTORS ON MOOSE POPULATIONS

If predator control is to be biologically justified to increase harvest of moose, predation must be a major factor limiting the moose population. In 9 of 10 multiyear, telemetry-based studies in moose–bear–wolf systems, predation (primarily on calves) was the dominant factor affecting moose population dynamics compared with harvest, malnutrition, disease, and adverse weather (Gasaway et al. 1983, 1992; Larsen et al. 1989; Ballard et al. 1991; Osborne et al. 1991; Bowyer et al. 1998; Bertram and Vivion 2002; Testa 2004; Keech 2005). In the remaining study area (Game Management Unit [Unit] 20A; Fig. 1), predation was the lowest among the 10
studies, and moose reached the highest densities; as a result, density-dependent food limitation and predation had similar major limiting effects on the population (Boertje et al. 2009). Other factors in Unit 20A had minor effects.

During a brief historical period, harvest played a substantial role in moose population dynamics in inland Alaska. For example, harvests (10–19% of prehunt no.) were well above sustainable levels during winter-induced declines in moose populations in the early 1970s (Gasaway et al. 1983). Managers during that period did not adequately evaluate 1) the precipitous decline from synergistic effects of predation and severe winters, 2) a lag time before moose would regain elevated rates of reproduction, and 3) improved success rates of hunters given the arrival of snowmobiles (Gasaway et al. 1983; Boertje et al. 1996, 2007).

Winterkill also occasionally affected moose population dynamics. Ballard et al. (1991) documented substantial winterkill among radiocollared calves (not radiocollared yearlings or ad) in winter 1978–1979 in Unit 13 (9 of 14 Oct calves died from winterkill). In addition, Boertje et al. (2009) documented that 16 of 42 October calves (38%) died from winterkill during winter 2004–2005 near McGrath, Alaska, although the moose population continued to increase (Keech 2005, 2008). Winterkill was negligible in 19 other mortality studies where biologists radiocollared moose calves in Alaska and Yukon (Keech 2005, 2008; Boertje et al. 2009, table 4). The most severe, documented cases of winterkill affecting moose populations in inland Alaska occurred during 1965–1966 and 1970–1971, when substantial numbers of calves, as well as some adults, died (Bishop and Rausch 1974). These results indicate that winters in inland Alaska infrequently caused substantial winterkill. Winterkill of moose is more common where severe cold is combined with deep snow (e.g., some coastal and Arctic regions; Alaska Department of Fish and Game [ADF&G] 2008a), so predator control would be less effective at increasing yield of moose in those areas.

Gasaway et al. (1992) studied various factors affecting a low-density Alaska moose population and concluded that predation was the primary factor keeping moose densities low. Gasaway et al. (1992) also presented data from 36 study areas in Alaska and Yukon and concluded that combined predation by lightly harvested wolf and bear populations kept moose at a low-density, dynamic equilibrium in large study areas where moose were not seasonally concentrated. Moose densities fluctuated in these systems but remained ≤417 moose/1,000 km2 and well below food-limited densities. A more recent compilation of moose nutritional data from 15 sites in Alaska confirmed that moose nutrition was moderate or high, except where humans substantially mitigated predation (Boertje et al. 2007, 2009). Moose densities were >417 moose/1,000 km2 in large study areas with a single or no predator species, where predators were limited by harvest or by human presence, where moose were a secondary prey of wolves and bears, and following effective predator control (Gasaway et al. 1992).

In 4 studies, investigators analyzed and modeled annual mortality of postcalving moose populations, which consisted of all yearlings and adults in early May plus all newborn calves born in the ensuing weeks (Boertje et al. 2009, table 5). In 3 studies of low-density postcalving moose populations, where bear predation dominated, predators annually killed 31–41% of moose populations. Investigators indicated that this level of predation was sufficient to maintain moose populations at low densities. In contrast, in the study area with lowest bear predation (Unit 20A), predators annually killed only 19% of the postcalving moose population, and the population was increasing. In all 4 studies, 75–88% of predator-killed moose each year were calves (Boertje et al. 2009). These studies clarified that predators limit moose populations primarily by preying on juvenile moose. Predators rarely killed moose aged 2–6 years regardless of moose density (Gasaway et al. 1983, 1992; Boertje et al. 2009).

Predators killed 60–72% of radiocollared calves in 5 study areas associated with little or no predator control, in contrast to 30–53% of radiocollared calves in 3 studies where predation was substantially reduced (Keech 2008; Boertje et al. 2009, table 4). Methods were similar among calf mortality studies (Ballard et al. 1979). Scavenging was a minor factor affecting the results in these studies, as determined by observing carcasses (capture-induced mortalities) left afield for several days. In a few cases, investigators observed bears and wolves killing calves. Later investigations of these kill sites allowed investigators to verify differences between kill sites of bears and wolves. Bears usually left only a concentration of bone chips with the collar after killing young calves. In contrast, wolves left major portions of calf carcasses or scattered the remains and often carried the blood-stained collar some distance from the kill site.

To further address the effect of brown bear predation on moose, Boertje et al. (1988) investigated whether brown bears were scavenging or killing their prey. Boertje et al. (1988) located collared bears daily using a Piper PA-18 aircraft (Piper Aircraft, Inc., Vero Beach, FL) and immediately returned to all carcasses of adult moose via helicopter. All collared, adult brown bears sampled, for >11 bear–days during the spring, killed moose calves, but some bears were more effective predators than others were. For example, during the first 20 days after calving, 4 of 9 (<50%) radiocollared bears killed 21 of 29 calves killed by bears (72%). Adult, male brown bears were important predators of adult moose in spring. Brown bears appropriated and consumed more wolf kills of adult moose than vice versa, yet brown bears killed 4 times more animal biomass than they scavenged. Evidence of attacks on adult moose, including direct observations and evidence at kill sites, indicated brown bear were efficient predators on moose.

Identifying the dominant predator in a specific study area is important when designing effective predator-control programs. In the 4 studies of annual mortality on postcalving moose populations, bears killed 9–27% and wolves killed 8–15% of moose populations annually (Boertje et al. 2009, table 5). In 7 of 8 calf mortality studies (88%) to date (Boertje et al. 2009, table 4), investigators concluded
that black bears or brown bears were the most important predators of moose calves. In all 8 studies (100%), investigators identified combined predation by black bears and brown bears as the major cause of mortality among moose calves.

**MANIPULATIVE STUDIES**

A second step to biologically justifying predator control is to test whether predators kill healthy moose that would mostly live to be available for harvest. The definitive test is to substantially reduce predation and measure whether survival increases (Bergerud 1971). For example, if bear predation is reduced, and moose calves ultimately die anyway from other causes (e.g., wolf predation, drowning, hypothermia, disease, or starvation), then reducing bear predation alone cannot be scientifically sanctioned to increase yield of moose. In practice, wolves have been reduced to some extent in all areas where bears were reduced per recommendations by Gasaway et al. (1992), who proposed moderate reduction of bears and wolves rather than substantial reduction of either predator.

Investigators observed an increase in moose survival in 10 areas where predation was reduced or absent:

1. During 1976–1982, ADF&G aerial wolf control and private efforts temporarily reduced wolf density 55–80% below the precontrol density in Unit 20A (Gasaway et al. 1983, Boertje et al. 1996). Wolf numbers subsequently recovered in ≤4 years in most of the 13,044-km² study area and increased to new high numbers during a period of deep snowfall winters (1989–1990 through 1992–1993) and remained at those high levels at least through 2008 (Boertje et al. 2009). Early winter moose:wolf ratios increased from 13:1 precontrol to >40:1 postcontrol at least through 2008. The posthunt moose population increased rapidly (λ = 1.15) during the 7 years of wolf control and more slowly (λ = 1.05) during the subsequent 21 years until 2004. During 2004–2006, hunters harvested substantial numbers of female moose and reduced moose density as intended (λ = 0.96; Boertje et al. 2009). Moose densities remained low in areas where predation was not substantially reduced (Gasaway et al. 1992, Boertje et al. 1996, ADF&G 2008a). In the early 1990s, a second wolf control program in Unit 20A removed 100 wolves, which resulted in an additional 18 moose calves/100 females (≥29 months) in early winter at high moose density (960 moose/1,000 km²); this response was identical to that observed after the previous control action when moose density was low (250 moose/1,000 km²; Boertje et al. 2009). Thus, the largely additive effect of wolf predation on calves was similar over a wide range of moose densities and moose:wolf ratios (18–62 moose/ wolf) where bear predation was the lowest measured in Alaska (Boertje et al. 2009).

2. In 1979, translocation efforts temporarily reduced brown bear numbers about 60% in 3,346 km² of the upper Susitna River drainage (moose count area 3) on the border of Units 13B and 13E (Ballard and Miller 1990). During May–June 1979, 47 bears were removed. Wolves were rare in and nearby the study area by spring 1980 because of aircraft-assisted wolf hunting and ADF&G wolf control (Ballard et al. 1987). The November moose calf:100 female (>1 yr) ratio in count area 3 subsequently increased from 34 in 1978 to 58 in 1979 (r = 5.9, P < 0.05); no changes were observed during the same period in 2 count areas just south of the translocation study area (7 and 13), where bear numbers were not reduced. Before 1979, calf:100 female (>1 yr) ratios in count area 3 were correlated with ratios in count areas 7 and 13; the 1979 observed ratio of 58:100 in count area 3 fell outside the 95% confidence intervals for both prior correlations. These researchers calculated that bear removal resulted in a 78% reduction in calf mortality during the first 5 months of life. The following April, high calf survival persisted. High overwinter survival was attributed to favorable winter weather and scarcity of wolves. Following the translocation, Ballard and Miller (1990:12) concluded, “A 60% reduction in bear density during the first 6 weeks following moose parturition was sufficient to significantly improve calf moose survival. Whether lesser reductions in bear density would automatically result in proportional increases in moose calf survival is unknown and warrants further study.”

3. In May and June 1985, Boertje et al. (1987) air-dropped 12 metric tons of moose carcasses and scrap meat in a 1,000-km² area to attract brown bears for collaring, in and around a concentrated moose calving area, north of Tok, Alaska (Unit 20E). The early winter 1985–1986 calf:100 female (>1 yr) ratio (53:100 F) was the highest observed to date and was significantly higher than those recorded during the preceding 3 years (11–15:100 F; χ² test of independence; P < 0.005) as well as during the following 2 years, when baits were not available (26–36:100 F, P < 0.10; Boertje et al. 1995). Similarly, the calf:100 female ratio was significantly higher than that found in 3 untreated adjacent areas in 1985 (10–19:100 F, P < 0.005). Wolves and black bears were minor predators of moose calves in Unit 20E during this period (Gasaway et al. 1992). The study was preceded by wolf control during 1981–1983 (Gasaway et al. 1992). Boertje et al. (1995) concluded that brown bears were successfully diverted from preying on calf moose, and these calves survived to early winter.

4. To retest the effect of diversionary feeding of predators, researchers distributed 26 metric tons of moose carcasses in a 1,650-km² area west of Tok in Unit 20D in May 1990 primarily using UH-1 helicopters (Bell Helicopter, Fort Worth, TX; 15.8 tons/1,000 km²; Boertje et al. 1995). Moose calf:100 female (>1 yr) ratios were higher (P < 0.005) in early winter 1990 (42:100 F) compared with the 8 prior years (12–38:100 F) and 1990 untreated sites (11–27:100 F). An attempt to repeat this experiment in 1991 failed to produce a significant result, presumably because researchers distributed only 16 metric tons (9.7 tons/1,000 km²) of moose carcasses, and the
distribution pattern was focused more along roads and rivers. No helicopters were available in 1991, but a DHC–2 Beaver (de Havilland Canada, now Bombardier Aerospace, Quebec, PQ, Canada) was used for a brief period in early May. Implications are that substantially reducing brown bear predation on moose calves can lead to increased moose calf survival to early winter. The value of these diversionary feeding experiments was in evaluating the additive versus compensatory nature of predation on neonatal calves using a nonlethal technique, as recommended by Boutin (1992) and Gasaway et al. (1992).

5. In May 2003, 75 black bears (all >1 yr old) and 8 brown bears (including 2 cubs-of-the-yr) were translocated from and adjacent to a 1,368-km² study area encompassing McGrath, Alaska (Unit 19D; Keech 2005). This study was part of an adaptive management program (National Research Council 1997). The translocation experiment was again conducted in May 2004; researchers translocated 34 black bears (all >1 yr old) and 1 adult brown bear from the same area. In subsequent years, bears were not translocated. Approximate, independent black bear numbers were 96 in April 2003 (preremoval), 4 in June 2004 (postremoval), and 70 in May 2007. Wolves were harvested at rates of about 30% each winter before February 2004 when private aircraft-assisted wolf control began, and wolf numbers declined. Biologists annually monitored 50–81 newborn, radiocollared moose calves within the study area during 2001–2006 to determine survival rates and causes of death. Keech (2008) considered cohorts from 2001–2002 as untreated, and cohorts from 2003–2006 as fully or partially treated. Survival rates (May–Aug) for collared moose calves were 43%, 40%, 63%, 81%, 56%, and 75%, for the 2001 through 2006 cohorts, respectively. Bears were determined or inferred to be the source of mortality for 45%, 43%, 24%, 6%, 30%, and 18% of collared calves for the 2001 through 2006 cohorts, respectively. Annual respective survival rates for collared moose calves were 33%, 27%, 51%, 40%, 42%, and 63%. Keech (2008) concluded that bear translocation and wolf control resulted in a decrease in the number of calves killed, a corresponding increase in moose calf survival through the end of autumn in all 4 of the treated cohorts (2003–2006), and an increase in moose population size each year.

6. During 1957–1959, ADF&G introduced 6 moose calves to the 60-km² Kalgin Island west of Anchorage, Alaska (Paul 2009). In the absence of large predators, moose attained among the highest densities in Alaska by 1981 (2,700 moose/1,000 km²), and regulations allowed hunters to reduce the density to about 390 moose/1,000 km² by 1985 (Peltier 2008a). By 2003, the moose population attained the highest year-round density (2,983 moose/1,000 km²) reported in Alaska in early winter. This high density was accompanied by high calf:100 female (>1 yr) ratios (36–89:100 F during 1998–2005; Peltier 2008a).

7. Wolves were absent from the Kenai Peninsula south of Anchorage during 1915–1960 and held below food-limited densities through at least 1980 (Peterson et al. 1984). Moose attained among the highest densities recorded on Alaska’s mainland in habitats exceeding 2,000 km² (1,447 moose/1,000 km²; Gasaway et al. 1992).

8. Other than Unit 20A, the areas in Alaska with the highest densities of moose include Units 14 and central 20B, which contain the largest human settlements, and southwest Unit 20D, which has widespread agricultural development (Fig. 1; Gasaway et al. 1992, ADF&G 2008a, DuBois 2008). Predators are well below food-limited levels in each of these 3 areas (ADF&G 2006, 2007, 2008a). We conclude from these studies that wolves and bears at food-limited densities kill substantial numbers of calf moose that otherwise would mostly live and be available for harvest. Furthermore, where brown bears are the dominant predator, substantial wolf control alone can produce a slow increase in moose numbers (Ballard et al. 1987, 1991). Where wolves are the dominant predator, substantial wolf control alone can produce a fast increase in moose numbers (Boertje et al. 2009). Alternatively, moderate reductions in only bear predation may produce only a slow increase in moose because of the efficiency of wolf predation and the remaining bear predation (Hayes and Harestad 2000). Our conclusions agree with those from 3 studies in Canada, where wolf or bear numbers were substantially reduced, and moose numbers increased (Stewart et al. 1985, Larsen and Ward 1995, Hayes et al. 2003). We know of no contrary findings in these simple systems, where predation was substantially reduced, and moose survival was monitored. However, a response in moose calf survival will be moderated when deep snow and extreme cold prevail (Ballard et al. 1991, Boertje et al. 2009).

**RELATIVE YIELDS OF MOOSE AND HABITAT ISSUES**

Sustainable yields of moose clearly increased in areas with reduced predation. Within inland Alaska, the highest sustainable yields have come from portions of Unit 20 adjacent to and including the largest city, Fairbanks, Alaska, where predation has been low (Boertje et al. 2009). The highest sustained harvest density reached 57 moose/1,000 km² (5% of the prehunt population) in Unit 20A during 1996–2003. The moose population increased during this period (λ = 1.05), but male:female ratios declined. Managers implemented liberal antlerless harvests to increase harvests to 97 moose/1,000 km² (7% of the prehunt population), which had the intended effect of reducing the moose population. In most areas of inland Alaska, harvests are restricted largely to males (2–4% of prehunt numbers) to prevent harvest-induced declines in moose numbers while protecting adequate male:female ratios. In these areas, moose populations are at low, predator-limited densities, and sustainable yields are correspondingly low (<10 moose/
twinning rates of 7% (Boertje et al. 2007, 2009). Low nutritional status in central Alaska was documented based on the lowest multiyear fluctuations in the 1960s after federal predator harvests of female moose to moderate potentially extreme population density. After harvest-induced declines, ADF&G successfully argued for lower but continued population density. Harvests of female moose to intentionally reduce moose population size and to maintain a 2-year average twinning rate of 20%, female moose should be harvested in increasing numbers to stabilize population size and to provide for elevated yield (Boertje et al. 2007, 2009).

Ideally, habitat would be improved simultaneously with increases in moose numbers to help maintain the moose population’s nutritional status. The most practical way to improve large-scale habitat for moose is to burn mature forests. However, ADF&G has no authority to use prescribed fire and limited authority to develop policies on wildland fires. In Unit 20A, ADF&G staff prioritized habitat management because of increases in prehunt moose numbers from 2,500 in 1975 to >17,000 in 2003 (Boertje et al. 1996, 2009). In eastern and western Unit 20A during 1996–2006, ADF&G successfully encouraged state, federal, and native land managers to allow 5 wildland fires to burn sizeable areas (\( \bar{x} = 370 \) km\(^2\), total 1,852 km\(^2\)). Despite having a burn plan with the Alaska Department of Natural Resources since 1995, no prescribed fires occurred because of unfavorable weather for burning; alternative objectives, including protecting Fairbanks from smoke; and competition for qualified personnel and specialized equipment. In contrast, 3 prescribed fires burned 362 km\(^2\) in a remote portion of Unit 20E during 1997 and 1998.

**SUSTAINABILITY OF WOLF AND BEAR POPULATIONS IN INLAND ALASKA**

Alaska’s predator control programs for moose (Fig. 1) are largely restricted to Alaska’s extensive boreal forest biome with an unusual setting. Inland Alaska is about 530,000 km\(^2\) of intact wildlife habitat and large predator–prey systems, not fragmented by agriculture or human settlements. For example, <1% of Alaska is privately owned land, exclusive of lands transferred to Alaska natives. In contrast to Europe, southern Canada, and the other states of the United States, Alaska’s boreal forest retains abundant and widely distrib-
uted populations of wolves and bears. Large predators exist near all human settlements in forested areas of inland Alaska. Predator control programs were conducted on 9% of Alaska’s land area during 2006–2008; this area decreased to 7% in July 2009. Low human density and an urban-focused human population contribute to the abundance of large predator populations. Currently, there are 686,300 people living on 1,481,346 km² of land in Alaska, with an overall population density of 0.46 people/km². Most Alaskans (67%) live in or near the population centers of Anchorage (364,700) and Fairbanks (97,970; U.S. Census Bureau 2008). Other settlements are much smaller and occur mostly in coastal biomes, not inland Alaska.

Land is fragmented between state, federal, and private owners in Alaska, which limits the possibility for creating additional, large-scale predator control areas. For example, state wolf and bear control programs are not allowed on the 32% of Alaska’s land area managed by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service and National Park Service, which includes parks, preserves, and refuges (Fig. 1; Alaska Department of Natural Resources 2000). Remaining federal lands total 28% of Alaska’s land area, and predator control may be implemented on portions of these lands. The state owns widely dispersed parcels totaling 29% of Alaska’s land area, and Alaska Native American corporations and individuals own 12%.

Several additional factors help ensure the long-term security of sustainable wolf and bear populations. Alaska’s predator control areas are dispersed across mostly rural areas of Alaska with few roads and without large settlements (Fig. 1). Control areas are mostly forested, which provides cover for predators. In addition, managers must leave prescribed low levels of wolves in wolf-control areas each spring. In addition, wolves and bears recovered from more severe control programs before statehood (Harbo and Dean 1983, Ballard et al. 1991, Stephenson et al. 1995), and the most extreme programs, which included widespread poisoning, have been illegal since statehood. Specifically, prestatehood control programs employed federal staff to drop poisoned baits from aircraft and to set cyanide bait guns on the ground (Harbo and Dean 1983). Moose populations were at peak, probably unsustainable, densities at statehood, partly as a result of these poisoning programs and because of recent wildland fires (Bishop and Rausch 1974).

Since statehood, the only proven, legal methods for private citizens to reduce wolf populations in rural, forested, inland Alaska has been to use aircraft, including either shooting while airborne or land-and-shoot methods. One or both methods have been approved by the Board of Game for each control area (Fig. 1). Aerial gunning was used in the mid-1970s, and recovery of wolf populations was well documented (Ballard et al. 1987, Boertje et al. 1996). Before aircraft can be used to effectively reduce wolf numbers, snow conditions for tracking wolves are necessary. Adequate snow conditions in most areas do not prevail every winter and often prevail for only short periods. In less-forested, coastal areas of western Alaska, local hunters using snowmobiles have been able to limit wolf numbers (Ballard et al. 1997). Also, rabies has occasionally limited wolf numbers, but rabies has only been documented in and near coastal areas of western and northern Alaska in recent times (Ballard et al. 1997, Ballard and Krausman 1997).

Given low to moderate rates of human-caused mortality and low rates of disease and starvation in inland Alaska, most local wolf densities are regulated by food-supplies, predominately moose and caribou numbers (Ballard et al. 1987, Mech et al. 1998, Adams et al. 2008). For example, wolf densities in inland Alaska are greatest immediately south of Fairbanks in Unit 20A (Fig. 1), where moose densities are the highest in Alaska (Boertje et al. 1996, 2009). Wolf densities are less in other areas of inland Alaska, largely because prey densities are less (Boertje et al. 1996, National Research Council 1997, Mech et al. 1998). Seven telemetry studies on wolves in mostly forested areas of inland Alaska and wolf density estimates across most of inland Alaska confirm that wolf densities are largely proportional to prey biomass (Mech et al. 1998, Boertje and Gardner 2000, Adams et al. 2008), as elsewhere in North America (Fuller 1989).

Exceptions to food-limited wolf populations occur if humans regularly take ≥30% to ≥39% of autumn wolf numbers annually, yet wolf populations are well adapted to high harvest rates (Fuller et al. 2003, Adams et al. 2008). Adams et al. (2008) discussed how wolves adjust dispersal rates as a primary mechanism to compensate for human take. Wolves mostly disperse from areas with negligible harvest, for example Denali National Park (Mech et al. 1998). Wolves disperse less as harvest increases, although wolves continue to disperse even with moderate harvest rates (Ballard et al. 1987, Adams et al. 2008). Extensive movements occur regularly and have reached 700 km in Alaska (Stephenson et al. 1995, Adams et al. 2008). Thus, localized reductions in wolf numbers are offset by immigration and subsequent reproduction of dispersing wolves (Peterson et al. 1984, Ballard et al. 1987, Adams et al. 2008). Based on these studies, wolves in most of Alaska and northern Canada are one contiguous population.


New, experimental methods to increase the take of bears in control areas (Fig. 1) included liberalizing bear harvest regulations as early as 2002 and encouraging control of bears by private, state-authorized permittees as early as 2004. The most notable, new, area-specific harvest regulations included
no closed season for brown bears without cubs or yearlings (2003), a bag limit of 2 brown bears (2004), sale of black bear hides and skulls (2006), and shooting black bears without cubs over bait same-day-airborne (2006; yr shown in parentheses is initial yr for ongoing regulatory programs). These regulations did not necessarily apply in all the control areas (Fig. 1) but were experimented with primarily in Unit 20E and portions of Units 13, 16, and 19. These regulations were ineffective at increasing the harvest of bears, except in Unit 16 (ADF&G 2007, 2008b). In Unit 16, near Anchorage, liberalized hunting regulations and heightened interest in black bear hunting stimulated substantially increased harvest of black bears beginning in autumn 2006 (Peltier 2008b).

New, area-specific (Fig. 1) control methods allowed permittees to 1) shoot brown bears under a quota system, over bait, and same-day-airborne (2004); 2) sell brown bear skulls and raw hides (2006); 3) shoot any black bear over bait and same-day-airborne with no individual limit (Unit 16 only, 2007); and 4) foot-snare black bears (Unit 16 only, 2009). These control measures too were only effective, to date, at contributing to increased take of black bears in Unit 16 (ADF&G 2007, 2008a; Peltier 2008a). Also in Unit 16, a private, nonprofit organization facilitated the take of black bears beginning in 2007. The Board of Game terminated control methods for brown bears in Unit 20E in 2009 after experimentation failed to increase the take of brown bears during 1 April 2005 to 30 June 2009 (Gross 2007).

Lessons from settled areas showed that manipulation of bear and wolf populations can result in elevated sustained yield of moose (Gasaway et al. 1992, Boertje et al. 2009). In more remote areas, where bear habitat is contiguous and access is poor, no data are available to evaluate whether private take of bears can be a successful, long-term management tool to decrease bear numbers and to elevate sustained yield of moose. Where new control measures and regulations result in an increased take of bears, as in Unit 16, documenting effects on the bear and moose populations will require study.

Currently, the primary practical factors ensuring that Alaska predator populations remain sustainable include 1) lack of tradition and interest in harvesting wolves and bears relative to harvesting moose or caribou, and 2) the greater challenge and cost associated with harvesting wolves and bears because predators are elusive, particularly in forested areas, and usually occur at low densities compared with moose or caribou. A substantial, long-term change in ≥1 of these factors will warrant a reexamination of whether sustainability of predator populations is adequately ensured.

LEGAL BACKGROUND, VALUES, AND EXPECTATIONS

Alaska is unique among the states in having a legislative mandate to provide for elevated harvests of moose through intensive management, defined in statute as "management of an identified big game prey population consistent with sustained yield through active management measures to enhance, extend, and develop the population to maintain high levels or provide for higher levels of human harvest, including control of predation and prescribed or planned use of fire and other habitat improvement techniques" (Alaska Fish and Game Laws and Regulations Annotated 2008:29). Sustained yield was defined as "the achievement and maintenance in perpetuity of the ability to support a high level of human harvest of game, subject to preferences among beneficial uses on an annual or periodic basis." This 1994 legislation also defined "harvestable surplus," "high level of harvest," and "identified big game prey population." Young et al. (2006) discussed recent achievements and limitations of intensive management.

Philosophical direction on predator control is initiated through the governor, who appoints the legislature-approved Board of Game, comprising 7 nonagency individuals. The Board of Game is responsible for identifying big-game prey populations for intensive management and for passing regulations and plans to provide for elevated yield of moose. The governor also appoints agency policymakers and administrators responsible for implementing predator control in Alaska. The judicial branch provides oversight on these regulatory and legislative processes. In addition, statewide, voters passed initiatives (1996, 2000) related to banning same-day-airborne hunting of wolves (Regelin et al. 2005). Thus, a system of checks and balances governs this process.

The ADF&G, Division of Wildlife Conservation, provides biological and harvest information to the Board of Game. Likewise, the ADF&G, Subsistence Division, provides information on current and past wildlife uses and needs among rural households.

To clarify philosophical differences in this arena, we contrasted activities, preferences, and values of 4 primary stakeholder groups (Table 1). Our rationale came from prior published reviews, public and professional interactions (1978–2009), and public testimony at Board of Game meetings (1981–2009).

Opponents of predator control opined that 1) bears and wolves should be given equal or greater value compared with moose; 2) predators should be valued in a context of intact ecosystem function and a symbol of wilderness rather than as an impediment to ungulate management; 3) methods of control are unethical, unproven, uneconomical, and unsustainable; 4) reducing wolves and bears to increase moose harvest will fail because ecosystems are complex and incompletely understood; 5) alternatively, reducing wolves and bears will succeed, and moose will overpopulate and starve because population objectives are too high and long-term habitat degradation is likely; 6) Alaska should value its relatively unmanipulated predator–prey systems over manipulated systems; and 7) the public has a fundamental right to see wildlife managed without predator control.

Proponents of predator control opined that 1) there exists a legitimate demand, need, and legal mandate for additional moose harvest in portions of Alaska, and hunting is a fundamental right; 2) most of Alaska’s lands have relatively unmanipulated moose–bear–wolf systems with intact ecosystems where hunters play a minor role; 3) only the hunting
public pays for wildlife management, and they and ADF&G should be empowered to manage predator–prey relationships in some areas; 4) local residents generally support intensive management actions and argue that local uses of state land (29% of the state) should be decided in Alaska; 5) wolf and bear populations in most of Alaska are healthy and largely limited by available prey and other food supplies; 6) everyone should recognize that predators are renewable natural resources, and the intention is to increase harvest of moose locally, not pursue eradication of predators; and 7) the primary threats to predator populations worldwide include expansion of human settlements and loss of habitat to agriculture and development, yet Alaska predator populations are contiguous over vast areas of wilderness and can rebound from actions taken near a few, dispersed human settlements.

Commonality exists in that both sides of the predator control debate refer to themselves as conservationists, and both sides often claim their position is based on sound science. Differences, however, are commonly irreconcilable. Opponents of predator control generally favor the protectionist side of conservation issues, whereas proponents of control favor the consumptive side of conservation issues (Decker et al. 2006). Opponents generally exhibit higher psychological and intrinsic values for ecosystems with minimal human influences (National Research Council 1997, Schwartz et al. 2003). More specifically, predator-control opponents frequently place a higher value on protection and ethical treatment of individual predators than on managing wildlife populations for consumptive use. Predator-control proponents place a higher value on the heritage and culture, including Native American culture, of moose harvest, compared with protection of individual predators (Titus 2007). Key proponents also point to the role of hunters and hunting in achieving the successful North American model of wildlife conservation (Geist et al. 2001).

Opponents of predator control often ignore or misinterpret the host of informative case histories and prior applied research and favor future, nonapplied research or extremely expensive applied research. Opponents deem continuous predator control as impractical and often rule out predator control as a viable option if stochastic factors, such as adverse weather, can contribute to limiting moose numbers.

In contrast, proponents of predator control often expect a low to moderate level of applied research and monitoring. Proponents often simply seek empowerment through a particular regulatory action or control program that may reduce predation (e.g., aircraft-assisted control or new techniques) and typically view implementation of these programs favorably, regardless of whether efficacy is demonstrated. Proponents testify that 1) adverse weather in inland Alaska is shown to be a minor factor limiting moose populations compared with predation, and 2) adverse weather is uncontrollable, whereas predation is controllable.

Managers and objective biologists search for the most effective but least controversial methods of predator control. Ideally, ineffective techniques will be abandoned in part to reduce controversy. For example, the Board of Game eliminated ineffective measures to control brown bears in Unit 20E in 2009 (Gross 2007).

Both opponents and proponents of predator control advertise simplistic biology-based statements to garner support. For example, opponents of predator control often focus on low reproductive rates of bears to suggest bear populations are at a high risk of extirpation. This focus disregards other bear life-history traits, including high survival of a long-lived, elusive species and that hunted bear populations have greater recruitment rates than unhunted populations near carrying capacity (Miller et al. 2003, McLellan 2005, Czetwertynski et al. 2007). A relevant case history exists in Unit 13, where hunters failed to achieve objectives for strongly reduced brown bear numbers despite long-term elevated harvests (Tobey and Kelleyhouse 2007). Opponents of predator control also frequently exaggerate the effect of wolf control by announcing the cumulative tally of wolves taken among multiple years, with no reference to the annual proportions
of wolf populations taken and the compensating rates of increase that occur from high annual rates of reproduction and immigration (Adams et al. 2008).

A simplistic biological goal among key Alaska proponents of predator control is to elevate moose-harvest densities to the high levels found in Scandinavian systems with few or no large predators (Cederlund and Sand 1991, Boertje et al. 2009). However, in Alaska, bears and wolves are well established and managed for sustainability. In addition, carrying capacity of Alaska moose habitats appears low compared with Sweden, as indicated by low birth rates (75 calves vs. 117 calves/100 F ≥36 months when at similar, high, prolonged densities; Boertje et al. 2009). Proponents of control often have an additional simplistic view that moose will be added to the population with each predator killed, when in reality 1) predator populations in remote contiguous habitat can sustain kill rates that are often difficult to attain; and 2) substantial, long-term reduction in predation is apparently necessary to increase the sustainable yield of moose.

Policymakers, not biologists, play a leadership role in this arena partly because decisions are about what society should value (Table 1). Policymakers should also evaluate intended and unintended outcomes (levels of public satisfaction) of policies, while objective biologists focus on outputs (efforts and products) of management programs (Birkland 2005). Objective biologists can play a unique and vital role in presenting, evaluating, and interpreting data and reviewing efficacy and practical limitations of programs (Table 1). Impassioned biologists on both sides have a special duty to distinguish their judgments based on personal values from judgments based on science (Lackey 2007). When biologists make biased comments, valid collection and interpretation of data can be discredited in the public arena, and the role of biologists and science is diminished. To be credible and to add substance to these programs, biologists must avoid exaggerating potential consequences of predator control and be well-informed, unbiased, and respectful of political, social, and economic checks and balances that ultimately govern decision-making in this arena.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Substantially reducing predation for several years can result in more moose and elevated yields of moose in inland Alaska’s moose–bear–wolf systems. We base this conclusion on the results of 10 moose mortality studies, 36 case histories, 10 manipulative studies, and 15 moose nutrition studies, as well as the lack of substantive, contradictory results. Where moose numbers recently increased in response to low predation, ADF&G convincingly used nutrition-based guidelines to halt the unwise stockpiling of moose and further density-dependent declines in moose nutritional status. Also, the sustainability of Alaskan predator populations remains secure. Thus, valid biological and management support exists for predator control to increase yield of moose, if established nutrition-based guidelines are used to identify and administer feasible moose population objectives.

Evaluating the biological basis and management support for these control programs is a simple process compared with evaluating the management feasibility of most new programs and predicting results. To implement a program, administrators must consider the local, practical realities of integrating a host of factors and adapt the management as important, new information becomes available. Factors include public expectations of outcomes, biological interrelationships, environmental variables, predator control methods, current policies, changing political and societal values, budget and time constraints, potential benefits, legal issues, competing programs, personnel qualifications, public participation, logistics, landownership, access for predator control and harvest of moose, conflicts among moose hunters from different geographical areas, and study design. Many biologists ignore most of these considerations and focus comments largely on the biology and potential for improving study design. Given the complexity of this issue, predicting results of most predator control programs will continue to be problematic.

We recommend opponents and proponents of predator control openly communicate their value-laden perspectives without distorting the science, maligning objective biologists, or fabricating conspiracies. Communicating biased science immediately reduces one’s credibility and often strongly reduces opportunity for constructive dialogue and transparent decision-making. We also recommend future reviews provide complete relevant results from biological studies and case histories, both sides of the local and larger debates, and clarification that the governor is ultimately empowered to lead these programs for favored constituents. Selective information fuels unnecessary controversy and can diminish the value of objective, evidence-based science.

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